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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-SOLITARY CONFINEMENT: DUE PRO
CESS LIBERTY INTERESTS-Gibson v. Lynch, 652 F.2d 348 (3d Cir.
1981).

I.

INTRODUCTION

Prison overcrowding has increased in recent years 1 and it is un
likely that the situation will be alleviated substantially in the near
future. Consequently, prison administrators have devised means by
which to cope with the problem of insufficient cell space for prison
ers. Defense counsel have been confronted with prisoner claims of
cruel and unusual punishment, as well as fourteenth amendment vi
olations resulting from the means devised by prison administrators. 2
Gibson v. Lynch,3 the subject of this note, illustrates one administra
tive response to the problem of prison overcrowding. Frazier Gib
son was placed in solitary confinement4 for a period of almost three
months due to a shortage of cells in the general population area of
Trenton State Prison. s He was not a disciplinary6 or risk prisoner,7
nor was he in need of protectionS for his own well-being.
I. As of March 31, 1978, out of 82 court orders concerning conditions of confine
ment in federal and state correctional facilities, 26 involved the issue of overcrowding.
NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, 3 AMERICAN PRISONS AND JAILS 32 (1980).
2. One method employed by prison administrators to cope with the overcrowding
has been to double and triple-cell inmates within the prison. See Rhodes v. Chapman,
452 U.S. 337 (1981); Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1278 (S.D. Tex. 1980), mod!fted,
650 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1981).
3. 652 F.2d 348 (3d Cir. 1981).
4. Solitary confinement normally is utilized for prisoners who are under discipli
nary sanction or who require protection. Id at 354.
5. Id at 350.
6.
When an inmate is found guilty of committing a prohibited act, a deci
sion is made . . . as to the appropriate disciplinary action. The [sic] sanction
imposed is selected after careful consideration of many factors which may in
clude the inmate's past history offenses, his overall institutional adjustment and
the circumstances surrounding the particular infraction.
TRENTON STATE PRISON, INMATE HANDBOOK 31 (1977) [hereinafter cited as INMATE
HANDBOOK].
7. "Disciplinary detention is used . . . where the inmate's presence in the general
population poses a serious threat to person, property, orderly operations or the security
of the institution." Id at 35.
8. "Administrative segregation . . . is used for the protection, confinement or
treatment of those who cannot safely participate in, or adjust to the ordinary routine of
the institutional program until evidence is available to warrant return to the general pop
ulation." Id at 38-39.
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This note addresses the question of whether a prisoner's expec
tation of the treatment that he will receive upon arrival at the prison
is a protected liberty interest and whether this interest is violated
when the prisoner is held under solitary conditions for administra
tive convenience rather than for disciplinary or protective reasons.
The first area discussed in this note is the eighth amendment's prohi
bition against cruel and unusual punishment. 9 Following this discus
sion is an overview of Supreme Court decisions in which the nature
of an individual's liberty interest formerly had been interpreted
broadly but in recent years has been narrowed sharply. Finally, an
individual's right to a hearing will be examined.
II.

A.

GIBSON

Gibson J' Confinement

Frazier Gibson was convicted in New Jersey state court for pos-:
session of a stolen vehicle and sentenced to a minimum of three
years and a maximum of five years imprisonment. 10 Gibson was sen
tenced on December 16, 1976. 11 He was sent to the Essex County
JaiP2 and was later transferred to the Classification Center at
Yardville. I3 There, he was housed in an individual cell in the recep
tion unit because he was an adult and Yardville's population was
primarily youthful inmates. 14 While at Yardville, Gibson was not
allowed to mingle with the general population, nor was he allowed
access to the legal library, visitors, or to attend general worship serv
ices. ls Denial of these privileges, however, was normal procedure l6
9. The courts have failed to devise an overall standard to aid in determining
whether a given situation rises to the level of cruel and unusual punishment. See, e.g.,
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) ("prisoner must allege acts or omissions suffi
ciently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs"); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (prohibits "excessive" punishment which involves "the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" and is "grossly out of proportion to the sever
ity of the crime"); Feeley v. Sampson, 570 F.2d 364, 370 (1st Cir. 1978) (nature and
duration of new form of incarceration must not exceed original purpose); M.C.I. Con
cord Advisory Bd. v. Hall, 447 F. Supp. 398,404 (D. Mass. 1978) ("contemporary stan
dards of decency"); State v. Smith, 58 N.J. 202, 211, 276 A.2d 369, 373 (1971) ("clearly
arbitrary and without rational relation to the offense or so disproportionate to the of
fense"); State v. Fearick, 132 N.J. Super. 165, 170,333 A.2d 29,31 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1975), qffd, 69 N.J. 32, 350 A.2d 227 (1976) ("neither shock the general conscience
nor violate principles of fundamental fairness").
10. 652 F.2d at 350.
11. Id
12. Id
13. Id This transfer occurred on January 25, 1977. Id
14. Id
15. Id

1982)

SOLITARY CONFINEMENT

249

for handling inmates awaiting classification l7 and assignment to one
of the adult prison populations. On February 8, 1977, Gibson was
classified for Rahway State Prison, a medium security institution. IS
Due to a shortage of cell space at Rahway, however, he was trans
ferred to Trenton State Prison, a maximum security institution,19
where he was considered a "housing hold."20
Upon arrival at Trenton, Gibson was put directly into 10ck-up.21
Normally, lock-up was used to discipline inmates who violated
prison rules, to segregate inmates who were considered especially
dangerous, or to protect the lives of those inmates threatened by
other prisoners. 22 In 1977, however, New Jersey had a serious
shortage of cell space within its prison system. 23 In addition, seventy
prisoners had been transferred to Trenton from the minimum secur
ity prison at Leesburg for their involvement in a disruption there. 24
Therefore, the solitary confinement cells were utilized to accommo
date the additional prisoner population.
Gibson's confinement at Trenton from March 4, 1977, until
June 1, 1977, was in Seven Wing, which contained maximum secur
ity isolation cells. 25 His activities were restricted severely. He was
16. "No group religious services are conducted for residents of the reception unit
and they are not provided access to any law library, nor any recreational or educational
library which may be available to the youthful inmates of the center." Brief on Behalf of
Defendant-Appellant at 12a-13a, Gibson v. Lynch, 652 F.2d 348 (3d Cir. 1981) [hereinaf
ter cited as Brief on Behalf of Defendant-Appellant).
17. The first two weeks of a prisoner's confinement is spent in the reception center
at the Yardville facility where the prisoner undergoes a series of evaluations, examina
tions, and interviews. Personnel at Yardville compile personal information on the pris
oner along with any information received from the courts. When this process is
completed, the prisoner appears before the Prison Complex Inter-Institutional Classifica
tion Committee. This committee, which is made up of the superintendents, or their
designates, of Trenton, Rahway, and Leesburg State Prisons makes the initial institution
assignment. INMATE HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 2.
18. 652 F.2d at 350.
19. Id
20. Id
21. Gibson was considered a "housing hold" because he was awaiting cell space at
Rahway. Id Brief on Behalf of Plaintiff-Appellee at 7, Gibson v. Lynch, 652 F.2d 348
(3d Cir. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Brief on Behalf of Plaintiff-Appellee).
22. 652 F.2d at 350.
23. Id
24. Id
25. Id Gibson was confined in a cell that was five feet by seven feet by eight feet,
with a solid wall on three sides and a metal gate on the front. The cell contained a steel
bed, a toilet, and a sink with cold running water. Id Gibson described the toilet facili
ties as "protruding from the back wall of the cell leading from a center trap area." Brief
on Behalf of Plaintiff-Appellee at 7, supra note 18. As a result of this set-up, a stench
from the toilets on the wing permeated the cell. Id
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confined to this cell for twenty-three hours and fifty minutes a day.
On six separate occasions, he was released for one hour of recrea
tion. 26 Gibson was not allowed to eat with the prisoners in general
population and was required, instead, to eat all meals in his cell.27
Gibson could shower for only ten minutes of each day.28 Other priv
ileges were withheld completely: He had neither radio nor televi
sion;29 was not allowed direct access to the legal library;30 was not
allowed to attend movies;31 was not allowed contact visits;32 was not
allowed to attend community worship services;33 and was not al
lowed access to the recreationallibrary.34 In addition, Gibson was
required to wear the same clothes from March 4, 1977, until May 5,
1977. 35 He was forced to launder his clothes in the cold water sink
within his cell and he had no other clothes to wear while his laun
dered clothing dried. 36
B.

The Findings of the District Court

On May 26, 1977 Gibson filed apro se complaint37 alleging that
his confinement under solitary conditions, the result of New Jersey's
lack of prison housing, violated his constitutional rights. 38 Prior to a
hearing on the merits of his claim, he was removed from solitary
confinement.39
On August 14, 1978 an attorney was appointed for Gibson40 and
26. Brief on Behalf of Plaintiff-Appellee at 7, supra note 21.
27. Id
28. 652 F.2d at 350.
29. Brief on Behalf of Plaintiff-Appellee at 8, supra note 21.
30. Brief on Behalf of Defendant-Appellant at 14a, supra note 16.
31. Id
32. Id
·33. Id
34. Id
35. Brief on Behalf of Plaintiff-Appellee at 8, supra note 21. His clothing consisted
of one set of underwear, a pair of sneakers, a pair of socks, a khaki shirt and a pair of
trousers. He was not issued any additional clothing nor was he able to obtain any laun
dry service ;or these clothes. Id Included in the list of rights to which the prisoners at
Trenton were entitled was "the right to health care which include[d). . . proper bedding
and clothing, [and) a laundry schedule for cleanliness of same. . . ." INMATE HAND
BOOK, supra note 6, at 16.
36. Brief on Behalf of Plaintiff~Appellee at 8, supra note 21.
37. Id at 3; Brief on Behalf of Defendant-Appellant at 2, supra note 16. The com
plaint was filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) in the Federal District Court in Newark,
New Jersey seeking injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment.
38. Brief on Behalf of Defendant-Appellant at 5a, supra note 16.
39. 652 F.2d at 349.
40. Brief on Behalf of Plaintiff-Appellee at 3, supra note 21; Brief on Behalf of
Defendant-Appellant at 2, supra note 16.
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on October 2, 1978 an amended complaint was filed. 41 The com
plaint deleted the claim for injunctive relief, added Superintendent
Lynch of Yardville and Commissioner Fauver of the Department of
Correction as defendants, and sought damages for Gibson's confine
ment in Yardville and Trenton. 42
On March 5 and 6, 1979, pursuant to a May 2, 1978 order of the
district court,43 an evidentiary hearing was held before a United
States Magistrate. 44 On May 25, 1979, the magistrate filed with the
court a report and recommendation45 that judgment in the sum of
eight-hundred dollars be entered against defendants Hilton and
Fauver with costs and attorneys fees to be fixed. 46 The magistrate
further recommended that judgment be entered in favor of defend
ant Lynch. 47 On June 21, 1979, the magistrate reversed48 her judg
ment against Fauver since it had been determined that he had not
been the Commissioner of Corrections at the time of Gibson's im
prisonment. 49 On January 29, 1980, an order of the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey adopting the magis
trate's recommendations was entered. 50
The district court endorsed the magistrate's finding that Gibson
had a state created expectation of liberty under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 51 The court found that such an
41. Brief on Behalf of Defendant-Appellant, at 8a-Ila, supra note 16.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 7a.
44. Brief on Behalf of Plaintiff-Appellee at 4, supra note 21; Brief on Behalf of
Defendant-Appellant at 37a, supra note 16.
45. Brief on Behalf of Defendant-Appellant at 12a-31a, supra note 16.
46. Brief on Behalf of Plaintiff-Appellee at 4, supra note 21; Brief on Behalf of
Defendant-Appellant at 2-3, supra note 16.
47. Brief on Behalf of Plaintiff-Appellee at 4, supra note 21; Brief on Behalf of
Defendant-Appellant at 3, supra note 16.
48. The magistrate's amended findings, conclusion and recommendation reaf
firmed the previous report and recommendation except for the judgment against Fauver.
Brief on Behalf of Defendant-Appellant at 36a, supra note 16.
49. Brief on Behalf of Plaintiff-Appellee at 4, supra note 21; Brief on Behalf of
Defendant-Appellant at 3, supra note 16.
50. 652 F.2d at 349. Judgment in the sum of $800 was entered in favor of Gibson
against the defendant Hilton. Also, judgment was entered against Gibson in favor of the
defendants Lynch and Fauver. Brief on Behalf of Defendant-Appellant at 37a-38a,
supra note 16. On March 17, 1980 the magistrate filed another report and recommenda
tion stating that Gibson be awarded $5,497.50 as attorneys' fees together with costs of
$303.75. Id. at 39a-44a. On April 17, 1980, the district court filed an order adopting the
report of the magistrate and judgment was entered accordingly. Id. at 45a-46a.
51. Brief on Behalf of Defendant-Appellant at 27a, supra note 16. The fourteenth
amendment provides in part that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1.
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expectation had been violated on the basis of his solitary confine
ment at Trenton State Prison and that defendant Hilton was not en
titled to the defense of immunity.52 The court found that no steps
had been taken to remedy Gibson's situatio"n, although prison offi
cials were aware of the conditions and other inmates had been re
turned to general population. 53 The district court rejected Gibson's
claim that his confinement at both Yardville and Trenton violated
eighth amendment standards and also rejected his claims of due pro
cess violations at Yardville. 54
Defendant Hilton filed a motion of appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on April 28, 1980. 55 The
Third Circuit agreed with the district court that the conditions under
which Gibson lived during this period did not violate the eighth
amendment. 56 The Third Circuit did not agree, however, that Gib
son's confinement violated his fourteenth amendment right to due
process and reversed the district court's orders awarding damages,
costs, and attorneys' fees to Gibson. 57

II.

THE PARAMETERS OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
ARE THERE GUIDELINES?

The New Jersey Constitution provides that "[e]xcessive bail
shall not be required, excessive fines shall not be imposed, and cruel
and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted."58 This is virtually
identical to the eighth amendment of the United States
Constitution.59
The New Jersey Superior Court has defined punishment to be
cruel and unusual if the nature of the punishment shocks the general
conscience or violates principles of fundamental fairness. 6o The
Supreme Court of New Jersey has held that it "will not interfere
with the prescribed form of penalty unless it is so clearly arbitrary
and without rational relation to the offense or so disproportionate to
52. Brief on Behalf of Defendant-Appellart at 37a-38a, supra note 16.
53. Id.
54. 652 F.2d at 350.
55. Brief on Behalf of Defendant-Appellant at 47a, supra note 16.
56. 652 F.2d at 351.
57. Id. at 349-50.
58. N.J. CONST. art. I, § 12.
59. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments indicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
60. State v. Fearick, 132 N.J. Super. 165, 170,333 A.2d 29, 31 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div.1975), aJl'd, 69 N.J. 32, 350 A.2d 227 (1976).
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the offense as to transgress the Federal and State [constitu
tions]. . . ."61 In addition, there should be no judicial interference
"either as to the classification of offenders selected for separate treat
ment or as to the penalty prescribed for them, unless it is clearly
constitutionally indefensible. "62
At least one Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States
has written on the subject. Justice Brennan indicated that the test of
whether a punishment is cruel and unusual involves several factors,
including whether the "punishment is unusually severe, [whether]
there is a strong probability that it is inflicted arbitrarily, [whether]
. . . it is substantially rejected by contemporary society, and
[whether] there is no reason to believe that it serves any penal pur
pose more effectively than some less severe punishment. ..."63
Against this background, the Third Circuit began its discussion
of whether Gibson's confinement constituted cruel and unusual pun
ishment by noting that as a convicted and sentenced prisoner, Gib
son could not claim the right to be free from punishment. 64 He
could only claim the right to be free from excessive punishment "so
totally without penological justification that it result[ed] in the gratu
itous infliction of suffering."65 The court then noted that the condi
tions of Gibson's confinement satisfied his basic needs for nutrition
and shelter. 66
The court of appeals noted that the district court, in adopting
the magistrate's recommendation, had aiso concluded that Gibson's
nutritional needs were met while he was at Trenton. 67 Acknowledg
ing that his living and hygienic accommodations were spartan, the
district court concluded that they were not injurious to a person in
reasonable physical and mental health. 68 His medical needs were
met and he was not callously denied medical attention. 69 Gibson,
however, testified that he received less than adequate medical atten
tion and that he was never given a medical examination to investi
gate his complaint of stomach problems. 70 The Third Circuit's
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

State v. Smith, 58 N.J. 202, 211, 276 A.2d 369, 373 (1971).
Id, 276 A.2d at 374.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 282 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
652 F.2d at 352.
Id (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976».
652 F.2d at 352.
67. Id
68. Brief on Behalf of Defendant-Appellant at 20a-2Ia, supra note 16.
69. Id at 21a.
70. Trial Transcript at 38-39, 70-71, Gibson v. Lynch, 652 F.2d 348 (3d Cir. 1981)
[hereinafter cited as Trial Transcript). Rather, he was given an array of medication in an
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conclusion that adequate attention was given to Gibson's "nutri
tional and other needs,"71 however, ignored the fact that Gibson was
required to wear the same set of clothing for two months. In addi
tion, all of his meals had to be taken in the cell, which was perme
ated with the smell of human waste from outdated toilet facilities
protruding from the back wall of the cell.72
The question raised by Gibson's confinement was whether his
treatment was without penological justification, thereby making it
excessive punishment. In an earlier decision, Hodges v. Klein,73 the
District Court of New Jersey held that "segregated confinement does
not in itself constitute cruel and unusual punishment. ..."74
Hodges was a constitutional challenge to the creation and mainte
nance of a special unit known as the Management Control Unit
(MCU) at Trenton State Prison. Several months of unrest at Tren
ton resulted in an administrative decision that a close custody unit
was necessary. Under this plan, inmates in the general population
who required more stringent security measures were segregated from
others and their movements were restricted. 75 Wing officers were in
structed to compile lists of those inmates whom they believed needed
closer scrutiny.76 One week after the inmates were moved from gen
eral population to the MCU, they were given written notice that the
MCU had been created and a Special Classification Committee
(SCC) had been established. The notice stated that the SCC would
begin hearings to determine which inmates should remain in the
MCU.77 Approximately eighty inmates ultimately were designated
to remain and about forty inmates were designated for return to gen
eral population. The returning inmates were not moved immedi
ately because space was not available in general population to
accommodate them.78
Violence erupted in the MCU following an escape attempt in
which one inmate died and a prison guard was severely injured. 79
effort to find one that would alleviate the problem. He refused to take some of the medi
cation he was given because the medical assistant was treating him based on a descrip
tion of his symptoms which had been conveyed by word of mouth rather than from
information acquired during a medical consultation or a physical examination. Id.
71. 652 F.2d at 352.
72. Brief on Behalf of Plaintiff-Appellee at 7, supra note 21.
73. 421 F. Supp. 1224 (D.N.J. 1976), aJl'd, 562 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1977).
74. Id. at 1236.
75. Id. at 1229.
76. Id. at 1229-30.
77. Id. at 1230.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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Inmates were transferred to lower tiers of Seven Wing and placed in
empty cells. In some cases inmates had no clothes; the cells had no
mattresses and there was no running water in the sinks or toilets. 80
Although these transfers were made without prior notice and hear
ing, the court concluded that an inmate could be subjected to more
restrictive confinement without prior notice and hearing when exi
gent circumstances warranted. 81
The Hodges court noted that the purpose of twenty-four hour
lock-up segregation was to confine inmates who had displayed spe
cific and recurring violent destructive behavior. 82 Along these lines
even nonviolent and nondestructive inmates who disrupted the or
derly and peaceful operation of the prison could be segregated. 83
The court could not, however, understand the need to keep nonvio
lent inmates under twenty-four hour lock-up conditions because any
threat they may have presented existed only when they circulated in
general population. 84
Confusion about the need to impose such extreme lock-up con
ditions is equally applicable to Gibson. The Third Circuit specifi
cally stated that "Gibson was not a disciplinary problem, was not in
need of protective custody and was not uncontrollable or suffering
from any serious maladjustment requiring administrative segrega
tion."8s Gibson had not displayed any characteristics that would
trigger administrative concern, yet he was kept locked up for twenty
three hours and fifty minutes per day and was deprived of all privi
leges for three months. Unfortunately, the Hodges court merely
questioned the necessity for keeping disorderly prisoners under
twenty-four hour lock-up conditions. The court stated that its own
views were irrelevant because a federal court could not command
state officials to disregard a policy that the state had decided was
suitable merely because the federal court believed the policy was un
sound or personally repugnant. 86
The deference given by a court to prison administrators in the
determination of whether certain treatment is cruel and unusual is
very broad. The only criterion seems to be whether administrators
decide that lock-up policy is suitable. Although individual punitive
80. Id at 1230-31.
81. Id at 1231.
82. Id at 1237.
83. Id
84. Id
85. 652 F.2d at 355.
86. 421 F. Supp. at 1237.
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administrativ~

decisions may not rise to the level of cruel and unu
sual punishment, the cumulative effect of these decisions may rise to
that level. There remains the issue of drawing the line to distinguish
between situations in which courts will intervene when a policy, suit
able to prison administrators, appears unsound or repugnant to the
court, and those situations in which the court will defer to the prison
administrator's judgment.
A Justice on the Supreme Court has addressed this question. In
his concurring opinion in Rhodes v. Chapman,87 Justice Blackmun
feared that the courts had adopted a policy of general deference to
prison administrators and state legislatures. 88 He believed that fed
eral courts should be available for those state inmates who made
claims of eighth amendment violations. 89 Incarceration entailed re
strictions and a loss of privileges but it was not "an open door for
unconstitutional cruelty or neglect."90
Rhodes marked the first time the United States Supreme Court
considered the limitation that the eighth amendment imposes upon
the conditions under which a state may confine convicted
criminals. 91 The Southern Ohio Correctional Facility (SOCF) began
receiving inmates in late 1972. Prison administrators began double
celling inmates in 1975 due to an increase in Ohio's state-wide prison
population. 92 The cells were modern. 93 Adjacent to the cell blocks
were "day rooms,"94 open to inmates between 6:30 a.m. and 9:30
87. 452 U.s. 337 (1981).
88. Id. at 369 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. The eighth amendment was made applicable to the states through the four
teenth amendment in both Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) and Louisiana ex
rel Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
92. 452 U.S. at 341.
Each cell at SOCF measures approximately 63 square feet. Each con
93.
tains a bed measuring 36 by 80 inches, a cabinet-type night stand, a wall
mounted sink with hot and cold running water, and a toilet diat the inmate can
flush from inside the cell. Cells housing two inmates have a two-tiered bunk
bed. Every cell has a heating and air circulation vent near the ceiling, and 960
of the cells have a window that inmates can open and close. All of the cells
have a cabinet, shelf, and radio built into one ofthe walls, and in all of the cells
one wall consists of bars through which the inmates can be seen.
Id. at 341.
94. According to the district court, "[tJhe day rooms are in a sense part of the cells
and they are designed to furnish that type of recreation or occupation which an ordinary
citizen would seek in his living room or den." Id. (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 434 F.
Supp. 1007, 1012 (S.D. Ohio 1977). Each day room contains a wall-mounted television,
card tables, and chairs. Inmates can pass between their cells and the day rooms during a
IO-minute period each hour, on the hour, when the doors to the day rooms and cells are
opened. Id.
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p.m. At the time of trial, SOCF housed 2,300 inmates, sixty-seven
percent serving life or other long-termed sentences. 95 About 1,400
inmates were double celled, of which approximately seventy-five
percent had the opportunity to spend most of their waking hours in
the day rooms, schools, workshops, library, visitation areas, at meals,
or in the showers.96
The district court concluded that double ceiling was cruel and
unusual punishment. 97 The Supreme Court disagreed and stated
that the findings of fact did not support the district court's conclu
sion. 98 The Court concluded that the Constitution does not mandate
comfortable prisons and that prisons like SOCF, which house per
sons convicted of serious crimes, cannot be free of discomfort. 99
This conclusion indicates that eighth amendment violations rarely
will be found and portends far reaching effects. The Court chose to
use prisoners' overall characteristics as a standard for determining
conditions of confinement, meaning the more serious the offense, the
less comfortable the prison may be.
The Rhodes Court noted that it could not be assumed that state
legislatures and prison officials were insensitive to the requirements
of the Constitution or to the sociological problems involved with try
ing to achieve the goals of the criminal justice system. lOO Recent
Supreme Court decisions have emphasized that deference should be
given to the informed discretion of prison officials,101 although this
notion has been tempered by the view that "prison administrators
95.

fd
Id
97. 434 F. Supp. at 1020. The district court rested its conclusion on five considera
tions: inmates were serving long terms of imprisonment which accentuated the problems
of close confinement and overcrowding; housing 38 percent more inmates than design
capacity necessarily involved excess limitation of general movement as well as physical
and mental injury from long exposure; studies had recommended each person in an insti
tution have at least 50 to 55 square feet of living quarters; at best a prisoner who was
double celled would spend most of his time in the cell with his cellmate; and SOCF had
made double celling a practice, therefore it was not a temporary condition. Id at 1020
21.
98. 452 U.S. at 347. There was no evidence that double celling under the circum
stances in Rhodes either infiicted unnecessary or wanton pain or was grossly dispropor
tionate to the severity of the crimes.
99. Id at 349.
100. Id at 352. These goals are ''to punish justly, to deter future crime, and to
return imprisoned persons to society with an improved chance of being usefullaw-abid
ing citizens." Id
101. "The necessary and correct result of our deference to the informed discretion
of prison administrators permits them, and not the courts, to make the difficult judgments
concerning institutional operations. . . ." Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Union,
433 U.S. 119, 128 (1977). "[I]n the absence of substantial evidence . . . to indicate that
96.
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may be 'experts' only by Act of Congress or of a state legislature." 102
If the courts blindly defer to the legislature and the legislature defers
to prison administrators, the end result may be that prisons will be
run by persons who are accountable to no one. The Court did not
define a "comfortable" prison, nor did the Court indicate the degree
of discomfort that would be allowed before an eighth amendment
violation was found. Any court's interpretation of the severity of an
offense, and the accompanying conditions of confinement, carries
with it a certain degree of subjectivity. Lack of a definitive standard
coupled with subjective evaluations of conditions ultimately will
lead to inconsistent determinations and will leave no foundation
upon which to base a claim of an eighth amendment violation.
Justice Marshall, dissenting in Rhodes, believed that as a result
of the rising crime rate of recent years, there was an alarming ten
dency toward a simplistic penological philosophy: if we lock the
prison doors and throwaway the keys, our streets will somehow be
safe.103 If an irrebuttable presumption were created that prison ad
ministrators are sensitive to constitutional requirements, and wide
ranging deference 104 is given to implement their policies, in the fu
ture, it is likely that much of what occurs in the prisons will not be
known to anyone except those inside. This confidence in the sensi
tivity of legislatures and prison administrators is misplaced. Evi
dence of this misplaced confidence can be found in the repeated
need for federal intervention to protect the rights of inmates. 105 In
light of this wide-ranging judicial deference, the minimal attention
given to Gibson's medical and hygienic needs, and the tenuous ra
tionalization for Gibson's solitary confinement, it may be said that
Gibson's confinement solely for reasons of administrative conven
ience was excessive.
the officials have exaggerated their response. . ., courts should ordinarily defer to their
expert judgment in such matters." Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974).
102. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 548 (1979).
103. Justice Marshall stated that, given the current state of affairs, it was "unrealis
tic to expect legislators to care whether the prisons are overcrowded or harmful to inmate
health." 452 U.S. at 377 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
104. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), the Court asserted that "[pJrison ad
ministrators. . . should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execu
tion of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order
and discipline and to maintain institutional security." Id. at 547.
105. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (lengthy periods of punitive
isolation); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (failure to treat inmate's medical needs);
Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388 (10th Cir. 1977) (severe overcrowding); Gates v. Collier,
501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974) (poor housing conditions); Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304 (8th
Cir. 1971) (unsafe conditions and inmate abuse).
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Judicial decisions provide little guidance to assist in the deter
mination of the bounds of cruel and unusual punishment. The deci
sions contain such phrases as "shocks the general conscience" or
"clearly arbitrary and without rational relation to the offense" but
the courts have failed to apply these standards in any predictable
fashion. 106 The courts have refused to interfere with decisions by
prison administrators when the decisions are thought to be suitable
and in response to exigent circumstances. 107 Indistinct standards
and wide-ranging deference to prison administrators make clear that
a violation of the eighth amendment's proscription against cruel and
unusual punishment rarely will be found. Denial of an eighth
amendment cause of action forces the prisoner to claim a due pro
cess violation of the fourteenth amendment for relief.
III.

LIBERTY INTEREST IN THE PRISON SETTING

Gibson argued that prisoners had a justifiable expectation that
they would not remain in solitary confinement for twenty-three
hours and fifty minutes a day for a period of three months unless
minimal due process procedures were followed. lOB This expectation
was created by the policies and practices of the New Jersey prison
system. 109 The district court found that Gibson was denied certain
106. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., Meachum v. Fano,427 U.S. 215, 22S-29 (1976); Hluchan v. Fauver,
4S0 F. Supp. 103, 10S-09 (D.N.J. 1979); Cobb v. Aytch, 472 F. Supp. 90S, 923 (E.D. Pa.
1979), mod!fied, 643 F.2d 946 (3d Cir. 19S1); Hodges v. Klein, 421 F. Supp. 1224, 1237
(D.N.J. 1976), affd, 562 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1977).
lOS. Brief on Behalf of Plaintiff-Appellee at 17, supra note 21.
109. Id The district court concluded that no constitutional entitlement, sufficient
to invoke due process, existed in a transfer to a less favorable institution without some
state practice that conditioned transfers upon proof of misconduct. Brief on Behalf of
Defendant-Appellant at 23a, supra note 16. The court looked to Meachum v. Fano, 427
U.S. 215 (1976) and Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976) for support for this propo
sition. See infra notes 149-56 and accompanying text. The district court then looked to
established prison policies and practices to determine whether they created some liberty
interest requiring due process. The court concluded that administrative quarantine, Gib
son's classification in the prison, was not different from the other classifications, thus
expressing a policy that isolated confinement for any appreciable period was to be pre
ceded by a hearing and subject to continuing review. Brief on Behalf of Defendant
Appellant at 25a-26a, supra note 16. "The meticulous details governing assignment to
isolated confinement reinforces the idea that isolation is an extreme circumstance, so
drastically different from the usual prison experience as to be in fact a matter of substan
tial importance to a prisoner." Id at 26a. The description of administrative quarantine
is as follows:
Be advised that effective immediately administrative quarantine
at State Prison, Trenton is to be used for the specific housing of the
following designated inmate personnel.
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privileges which appeared to be guaranteed to all inmates not subject
to disciplinary restrictions. 110 The court concluded that the express
l.

Prison Reception Unit housing holds assigned by Inter-Institution
Classification Committee for assignment to State Prison, Rahway
or State Prison, Leesburg.
2. Pre-Hearing Detention (Management Control Unit) inmates who
have been classified by the Special Classification Committee as
general population and are referred back to the sending institution
or to general population State Prison, Trenton pending space
availability.
3. State Prison, Trenton inmate personnel who may be experiencing
housing difficulties within the general population and re-assign
ment to another housing wing or unit is not readily available.
Placement in Administrative Quarrantine [sic] is also under the direct con
trol of the Superintendent, Assistants to the Superintendent, Chief Deputy and
the Area 1 and 2 Shift Captains. Under no circumstances are inmates to be
placed in Administrative Quarrantine [sic] without the above authorities written
and signed authorization to the Center Keepers.
Inmates placed in Administrative Quarrantine [sic] are to be afforded the
following sanctions:
1. Daily medical/dental and professional treatment staff
services.
2. Regularly scheduled showers.
3. Current rules and policies govering [sic] the general pop
ulation regarding reading-writing materials. Smoking in
their cells-personal clothing-and weekly canteen
services.
4. Inmates are entitled to window phone visits per institu
tional policy.
5. Inmates are entitled to phone calls per institutional
policy.
6. Inmates do not have contact visit rights while in Admin
istrative Quarrantine [sic].
7. Inmates do not have yard recreation rights while in Ad
ministrative Quarrantine [sic].
8. Inmates assigned to Administrative Quarrantine [sic] are
not processed through the State Prison, Trenton Prison
Classification Committee for custody or program
assignments.
The above listed sanctions are subject to review and change by the Super
intendent's [sic] Office at any time. Due notice of any changes in the sanctions
for administrative Quarrantine [sic] will be given to all parties directly responsi
ble for the management and security of said Unit.
Brief on Behalf of Defendant-Appellant at 33a-35a, supra note 16.
110. Brief on Behalf of Defendant-Appellant at 26a, supra note 16. The court enu
merated the following: an adequate clothing supply to be issued shortly after admission;
active and passive recreation including athletics, movies, reading and games; television in
the auditorium twice weekly; daily active indoor or outdoor recreation even though con
fined to reception or administrative segregation or a special treatment unit; a weekly
movie; and two hours per week of exercise even though confined to administrative segre
gation. Id "While none of the enumerated privileges individually rises to the substance
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policies of the Department of Corrections I I I created a justifiable ex
pectation that, without minimal due process procedures,112 Gibson
would not be confined in isolation for three months under the condi
tions found to have existed. l13
The Third Circuit, however, rejected the district court's conclu
sion and reversed its orders.114 Although the court acknowledged
that Gibson's confinement was severe, it emphasized that his quar
antine status was due to the shortage of cell space for the general
prison population. I IS The court of appeals decided that it could not
rely upon disciplinary cases nor upon cases concerning prisoner iso
lation in special risk units and in protective custody because those
cases had no bearing on Gibson's situation. I 16 The court stated that
of a constitutionally protected right, all of them taken together appear to present a way of
life which is guaranteed to New Jersey prisoners." Id
Ill. The Trenton State Prison Inmate Handbook for 1977 set out the inmates'
rights:
You have the right to expect that as a human being you will be treated
respectfully, impartially, and fairly by all personnel.
You have the right to be informed of the rules, procedures, and schedules
concerning the operations of the institution.
You have the right to freedom of religious affiliation, and voluntary reli
gious worship.
You have the right to health care which includes nutritious meals, proper
bedding and clothing, a laundry schedule for cleanliness of same, an opportu
nity to shower regularly, proper ventilation for warmth and fresh air, a regular
exercise period, toilet articles and medical and dental treatment.
You have the right to correspond and visit with family members, friends
and other persons where there is no threat to the security order or rehabilitation
in keeping with the rules and schedules of the facility.
You have the right to unrestricted and confidential access to the courts by
correspondence (on matters such as the legality of your conviction, civil mat
ters, pending criminal cases and to conditions of your confinement).
You have the right to legal counsel from an attorney of your choice by
interview and correspondence.
You have the right to participate in the use of Law Library reference
materials to assist you in resolving legal matters. You also have the right to
receive help when it is available through a legal assistance program.
You have the right to a wide range of reading material for educational
purposes and for your own enjoyment.
You have the right to participate in counseling, education, vocational
training, and employment as far as resources are available and in keeping with
your interest, needs and abilities.
INMATE HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 16-17.
112. The fourteenth amendment provides that no state shall "deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process oflaw." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
lB. Brief on Behalf of Defendant-Appellant at 27a, supra note 16.
114. 652 F.2d at 361.
115. Id at 354.
116. Id
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such a housing crisis had not occurred prior to nor since this particu
lar situation. 117 Because of this anomaly, Gibson's treatment was
considered acceptable as a legitimate response to a situation that had
taken prison administrators by surprise. I IS
The dissent, however, failed to "see how overcrowding in the
state system or the disturbance at Leesburg had any bearing on
whether an inmate receive[d] clean laundry, access to educational
and legal books. . . and regular showers with soap, hot water and a
towel."119 The dissent also questioned why sixty-nine of the Lees
burg inmates, transferred to Trenton State because of a disturbance
at Leesburg, were given a hearing and reassignment within a month,
while Gibson suffered for three months.120
A.

United States Supreme Court Liberty Interest Decisions

Due to the distinction the Third Circuit found between Gibson
and other prisoner isolation cases, the court applied the general prin
ciples found in related Supreme Court cases. 121 The court examined
three Supreme Court cases dealing with liberty interests. The first,
Wo!!fv. McDonnel/ 122 recognized that a state may afford a prisoner a
liberty interest under the fourteenth amendment. 123 The second two
cases, Meachum v. Fano 124 and Montanye v. Haymes,125 rejected
claims of prisoners seeking fourteenth amendment protection to pre
vent transfer from one prison to another. 126 The three cases dis
cussed by the court are part of a long line of cases in which the
Supreme Court has tried to define a liberty interest. 127 Although the
117. Id at 356.
118. Id Less than three years before Gibson's arrival at Trenton, the prison was so
overcrowded that a conscious policy to reduce the prison population was foUowed by
prison officials. Hodges v. Klein, 421 F. Supp. at 1228. Such a policy resulted in the
creation of the Management Control Unit. See supra text accompanying notes 73-86.
Prison administrators thus cannot make the claim that such a situation had never existed
before and that deference should be given to the decisions they made in coping with
Gibson's situation.
119. 652 F.2d at 367 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
120. Id
121. Id at 354. The Third Circuit previously had said it could not rely on these
cases. Id IronicaUy, the court relied on the general principles enunciated in these cases
to reach a decision in Gibson.
122. 418 U.S. 539 (1974). See infra notes 140-46 and accompanying text.
123. 418 U.S. at 557.
124. 427 U.S. 215 (1976). See infra notes 149-60 and accompanying text.
125. 427 U.S. 236 (1976). See infra notes 146-60 and accompanying text.
126. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 228; Montanye, 427 U.S. at 242-43.
127. See generally Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional
Complex, 442 U.S. I (1979); Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976); Perry v.
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Third Circuit did not discuss the entire line of cases, it chose the
three having the most significant bearing on the determination of the
liberty interest. Cases in the line dealing with liberty interests that
were not discussed by the court include Goldberg v. Kelly,128 Morris
sey v. Brewer, 129 Board of Regents v. Roth, 130 and Perry v.
Sindermann .131
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Morris
sey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Goldberg v. KeUy, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
128. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Goldberg was an action by "residents of New York City
receiving financial aid under the federaUy assisted program of Aid to Families with De
pendent Children (AFDC) or under New York State's general Home Relief program."
fd. at 255-56. Their complaint aUeged that . . . officials administering these programs
terminated, or were about to terminate, such aid without prior notice and hearing,
thereby denying them due process of law." fd. at 256. In holding that a pretermination
evidentiary hearing must be held, the Court made no mention of having to look to state
law to find a liberty interest, but instead looked to the impact upon the individual. fd. at
266.
129. 408 U.S. 471 (1972). "Petitioner Morrissey was convicted of false drawing or
uttering of checks in 1967." fd. at 472. He was paroled in 1968 and seven months later
he was arrested as directed by his parole officer because "he had violated ... [his] parole
by buying a car under an assumed name and operating it without permission, giving false
statements to police concerning his address and insurance company after a minor acci
dent, obtaining credit under an assumed name, and failing to report his place of resi
dence to his parole officer." fd. at 472-73. One week later the Parole Board revoked his
parole and returned him to an institution about 100 miles from his home. fd. He "as
sert[ed] he received no hearing prior to revocation of his parole." fd. at 473.
Morrissey was concerned with whether the general requirements of due process ap
plied to parole revocation. The Court noted that a parolee must rely on the implicit
promise that parole revocation wi11 only occur if he fails to live up to the parole condi
tions. fd. at 482. Termination of parole would inflict a "grievous loss" on the parolee
and would upset society'S stake in restoring the parolee to a normal and useful life. fd. at
482, 484. The Court required an informal hearing designed to assure that the finding of a
parole violation would be based on verified facts and accurate knowledge of the parolee's
behavior. fd. at 484.
130. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). Roth was hired as an assistant professor at a university
for one academic year. fd. at 566. He completed the term and was informed he would
not be rehired. fd. . He had no tenure right. fd. In Wisconson, a state university teacher
could acquire tenure as a "permanent" employee only after four consecutive years of
employment. fd. State law left the decision whether to rehire a nontenured teacher for
another year to the unfettered discretion of university officials, and the rules established
by the Board of Regents provided no real protection for the faculty members. The rules
created by the Board of Regents "provid[ed] that a nontenured teacher 'dismissed' before
the end of the year may have some opportunity for review" but there was no review
process for a nontenured teacher who simply was not reemployed. fd. at 567. Roth
aUeged, first, that the decision not to rehire him ''was to punish him for certain state
ments critical of the university administration," and this violated his right to freedom of
speech. fd. at 568. The second aUegation was that failure "to give ... notice of any
reason for nonretention and an opportunity for a hearing violated his right to procedural
due process of law." fd. at 569.
131. 408 U.S. 593 (1972). In Perry, a teacher in the state coUege system aUeged
that the decision not to rehire him was due to his public criticism of administrative poli
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In Goldberg, the Court asserted that "[t]he extent to which pro
cedural due process must be afforded the [individual] is influenced
by the extent to which he may be 'condemned to suffer grievous loss'
. . . and depends upon whether the [individual's] interest in avoid
ing that loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary adju
dication."132 The Morrissey court stated that "[t]he question is not
mer~ly the 'weight' of the individual's interest, but whether the na
ture of the interest is one within the contemplation of the 'liberty or
property' language of the Fourteenth Amendment."133 Although
Roth addressed the issue of property interest, the case is relied upon
in liberty interest decisions. 134 The Supreme Court stated that the
"Fourteenth Amendment's procedural protection of property is a
safeguard of the security of interests that a person has already ac
quired in specific benefits." 135 In order to have a property interest in
a benefit,
a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire
for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He
must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It is a
purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those
claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that
must not be arbitrarily undermined. It is a pUIP,ose of the consti
tutional right to a hearing to provide an opport~nity for a person
to vindicate those claims. 136

The Roth Court maintained "[p ]roperty interests . . . are not
created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their
dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem
from an independent source such as state law-rules or understand
ings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitle
cies thus infringing upon his right to freedom of speech. Id at 595. Even though he had
no contractual or tenure right he maintained that he and others relied on a provision in
the official faculty guide which indicated that reemployment would occur.
Teacher Tenure: Odessa College has no tenure system. The Administration of
the College wishes the faculty member to feel that he has permanent tenure as
long as his teaching services are satisfactory and as long as he displays a cooper
ative attitude toward his coworkers and his superiors, and as long as he is happy
in his work.
Id at 600.
132. 397 U.S. at 262-63.
133. 408 U.S. at 481.
134. The Supreme Court relied on Roth in its decision in Meachum v. Fano, 427
U.S. at 224. See infra notes 149-60 and accompanying text.
135. 408 U.S. at 576.
136. Id at 577.
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ment to those benefits." 137 This statement has been subject to varied
interpretation.
Subsequent cases have failed to recognize the phrase "such as"
preceding "state law" and have interpreted the phrase to mean that
property interests stem solely from state law.n s When properly di
vided into its component parts, the sentence means that property in
terests are created and defined by existing rules or understandings, a
significant word largely ignored in the decisions, that stem from an
independent source. State law was mentioned simply as one exam
ple of an independent source. The Court concluded that petitioner
Roth had no claim of entitlement nor was there any state statute,
rule or policy that created any legitimate claim to reemployment. 139
InPerry the Court examined the area of contract law that recog
nizes implied agreements although there has been no formal written
agreement. The Court recognized that "there may be an unwritten
'common law' in a particular university ... that has no explicit ten
ure system. . . but that nonetheless may have created such a system
in practice."I40
In Gibson, the Third Circuit interpreted WO!iF41 to mean that
137. Id.
138. See Sisbarro v. Warden, Mass. State Penitentiary, 592 F.2d I, 3 (1st Cir.
1979); Twyman v. Crisp, 584 F.2d 352, 356 (10th Cir. 1978); Feeley v. Sampson, 570 F.2d
364.376-77 (1st Cir. 1978); Russell v. Oliver, 552 F.2d 115, 117 (4th Cir. 1977).
139. 408 U.S. at 578.
140. Perry, 408 U.S. at 602.
141. Wolf involved a Nebraska statute which provided that the chief executive
officer of each penal facility was responsible for the discipline of the inmates. The statute
also provided a range of possible disciplinary action. 418 U.S. at 545.
Prison authorities, however, had established written regulations that dealt with pro
cedures and policies for controlling inmate misconduct. Misconduct was classified into
two categories: major misconduct, which was a "serious violation" and was to be for
mally reported to an Adjustment Committee having a wide range of sanctions available
to it; and minor misconduct, which was "a less serious violation" and could be resolved
immediately with or without formal reporting. Id. at 548-52. The Court reasoned that
deprivation of good time credit, although of considerable importance, was "qualitatively
and quantitiatively different from the revocation of parole or probation." Id. at 561.
"The deprivation of good time is not the same immediate disaster that the revocation of
parole is for the parolee." Id. Good time can be restored and thus may not result in a
postponement of parole eligibility and an extension of the term being served. Id. The
State, therefore, had a different stake in the structure and content of the prison discipli
nary hearing. Id. As prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecu
tion, the full range of procedures suggested in Morrissey, see supra notes 129, 133 and
accompanying text, were not necessary in order to satisfy the minimum requirements of
procedural due process. "[A)dvance written notice cfthe c.laimed violation and a written
statement of the fact finders as to the e"'idence relied upon and the reasons for the disci
plinary action taken [must be provided)." Id. at 563. An "inmate. . . should be allowed
to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him
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only state law is the source of a liberty interest. The court failed to
recognize that Wo!lf also acknowledged that written regulations, 142
which were framed by prison authorities and dealt with procedures
and policies for controlling inmate misconduct, could support a lib
erty interest. 143 Wo!lf was based on the existence of those regula
tions. The state had created the right to good time l44 and the prison
regulations illustrated that depriving a prisoner of good time was a
sanction used for major misconduct. 145 The prisoner's interest, there
fore, fell within the fourteenth amendment's liberty interest. 146
The Supreme Court stated that its analysis paralleled the due
process analysis used in property deprivation cases in which the
Court consistently held that a hearing was required before a person
may be deprived of his property. 147 The Court considered a person's
liberty to be equally protected stating that "[t]he touchstone of due
process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of
govemment."148 The Gibson court completely ignored this statement
from Wo!lf, relying instead upon two 1976 Supreme Court decisions,
Meachum and Montanye, as the bases for its decision.
Meachum and Montanye had a marked impact on the determi
nation of prisoners' liberty interests. In both cases neither state law
nor state practice existed which conditioned prison transfers on
proof of serious misconduct or the occurrence of other events. 149
to do so will not be unduly hazardous for institutional safety or correctional goals." Id
at 566. There was no constitutional right to confrontation and cross examination or to
appointed or retained counsel. Id at 567-70.
The Court further stated that the procedural requirements mandated in situations
where good time had been revoked also must be extended when solitary confinement is
at issue. Id at 571 n.19. Solitary confinement "represents a major change in the condi
tions- of confinement and is normally imposed only when it is claimed and proved that
there has been a major act of misconduct." Id
142. 418 U.S. at 548.
143. 652 F.2d at 354.
144. The term of a committed offender could be reduced for "good behavior and
faithful performance of duties while confined in a facility." 418 U.S. at 546 n.6.
145. Id at 551 n.8.
146. It! at 557. The Court stated that "the prisoner's interest has real substance
and is sufficiently embraced within Fourteenth Amendment 'liberty' to entitle him to
those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by the
Due Process Clause to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated."
Id
147. Id at 557-58.
148. Id at 558.
149. In Meachum, there had been a two and one-half month period in which nine
serious fires occurred in the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Norfolk, a me
dium-security institution. 427 U.S. at 216. Six inmates were removed from the general
population as a result of reports from informants and were placed in an administrative
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The issue in these cases was whether the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment entitled a state prisoner to a hearing prior to
being subjected to substantially less favorable conditions following a
prison transfer. The transfers in Meachum resulted in a change from
a medium security institution to a maximum security institution. 150
In Montanye, however, the prisoner was transferred from one maxi
mum security institution to another. 151 In neither case was there any
deprivation upon arrival at the new institution. 152
From the outset, the Court's discussion in Meachum indicated a
narrowing of its previously expansive interpretation of a liberty in
terest. The Court rejected "the notion that any grievous loss visited
upon a person by the State [would] invoke the procedural protec
tions of the Due Process Clause."153 The Court stated that there is
no constitutional guarantee that a convicted prisoner will be placed
into any particular prison. 154 A conviction extinguishes a prisoner's
liberty interest in having the decision regarding prison assignment
subjected to scrutiny under the due process clause. 155 "[T]o hold. . .
that any substantial deprivation imposed by prison authorities trig
gers the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause would
subject to judicial review a wide spectrum of discretionary actions
that traditionally have been the business of prison administrators
rather than of the federal courtS."156 The Meachum court dis
tinguished Wolff v. McDonnell 157 by stating that the liberty interest
detention area used to process new inmates. Id Proceedings before the Norfolk Prison
Classification Board were held regarding whether to transfer the inmates to another insti
tution. Id at 216-17. Individual classification hearings were held in which each inmate
had an attorney present. Id at 217. None of the inmates were given a copy of the
transcript or summaries of testimony given in camera by the superintendent. The Board
recommended that one inmate be placed in administrative segregation for 30 days; that
three inmates be transferred to Walpole, a maximum-security institution; and two be
transferred to Bridgewater, which had both maximum and medium-security facilities.
Id at 218.
In Montanye, an inmate was removed from his assignment as an inmate clerk in the
law library at the Attica Correctional Facility. 427 U.S. at 238. A document was circu
lated by the inmate complaining of deprivation of legal assistance. This document,
which was signed by 82 inmates, was seized by prison officials. Id at 237-38. The next
day the inmate was advised that he would be transferred to Clinton Correctional Facility
which, like Attica, was a maximum-security institution. Id at 238.
ISO. Meacham v. Fano, 427 U.S. at 218.
lSI. Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. at 238.
152. Meacham v. Fano, 427 U.S. at 221-22; Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. at 238.
153. Meacham v. Fano, 427 U.S. at 224 (emphasis in original).
154. Id
ISS. Id
156. Id at 225 (emphasis in original).
157. See supra notes 139-44 and accompanying text.
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protected in Wolff was rooted in state law but in Meachum there was
no liberty interest under Massachusetts law for a prisoner to remain
at the prison where he initially was assign~d: 158 "Holding that ar
rangements like this are within reach of the procedural protections of
the Due Process Clause would place the Clause astride the day-to
day functioning of state prisons and involve the judiciary in issues
and discretionary decisions that are not the business of federal
judges."159 Montanye adopted Meachum's holding and added that
"[a]s long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the
prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is
not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause
does not in itself subject an inmate's treatment by prison authorities
to judicial oversight."160 .
In Gibson, the Third Circuit rejected the district court's finding
of a policy and practice creating a liberty interest in a prisoner's con
ditions or degree of confinement. 161 The finding was first rejected
because Meachum and Montanye provided that "deprivations and
loss of privileges, even in combination cannot create a state expecta
tion or liberty interest."162 Second, the finding was rejected because
the policy or practice which Gibson asserted was never estab
lished. 163 The court gave undue weight to Meachum and Montanye.
Both of those cases dealt with prisoner transfers due to disciplinary
infractions. There, the inmates were not subject to disciplinary pun
ishment upon arrival at the transfer prison.
In Meachum, the Court specifically limited its holding to Massa
chusetts and stated that other states were free to develop their own
transfer policies.l 64 Meachum has been viewed as providing a hard
158. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. at 226.
159. Id at 228-29.
160. Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. at 242.
161. 652 F.2d at 357.
162. Id
163. Id The policy or practice of the institution was that after a short period of
orientation, prisoners were afforded all of the privileges of the general population, that
only risk inmates had privileges restricted, and that in all cases of restrictions hearings
were afforded. Id The court pointed to New Jersey's arguments that other inmates were
in the same position as Gibson and that "there had never previously existed a cell
shortage of such magnitude in the prison system which could have fostered the beginning
of any history of 'policies and practices as alleged.''' Id
164. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. at 228-29.
A prisoner's behavior may precipitate a transfer, and absent such behavior, per
haps transfer would not take place at all. But, as we have said, Massachusetts
prison officials have the discretion to transfer prisoners for any number of rea
sons. Their discretion is not limited to instances of serious misconduct. . . .
The individual States, of course, are free to follow another course, whether by

1982]

SOLITARY CONFINEMENT

269

and fast rule that although a prison transfer would have a substan
tially adverse impact on the prisoner, the resultant conditions of con
finement would not invoke fourteenth amendment protection. Such
an approach effectively prevents decisions on the merits of certain
cases. The court failed to consider the broader implications of its
limited view of a constitutionally protected liberty: "[I]f followed to
its extreme, [this view] would allow the state to pass a law granting
some benefit while explicitly disapproving the extension of proce
dural protections when a benefit [was] deprived."165
In Hodges v. Klein 166 the district court briefly touched upon the
issue of a hearing before prisoner transfer by noting that
[a]1though the expectation of remaining at a particular prison or in
a particular part of a prison unless found guilty of misconduct is
'too ephemeral and insubstantial' an expectation to require due
process protection ... it could be said that the New Jersey prison
complex (like others), through its policies and practices ... has
created a justifiable expectation that an inmate would not be
placed in solitary confinement or conditions similar to it absent
proof of misconduct or the occurrence of certain events. 167

Hodges, however, did not pursue the issue because Management
Control Unit (MCU)168 inmates were provided hearings and peri
odic review. 169 The Third Circuit in Gibson did not address this
statement by the Hodges court.
Greenholtz v. Inmates of The Nebraska Penal and Correctional
Complex 170 was a class action suit alleging that N"ebraska's statutes
and the parole board's procedures denied due process: 171 "The pro
cedures used by the Board to determine whether to grant or deny
discretionary parole arise partly from statutory provisions and partly
statute, by rule or regulation, or by interpretation of their own constitutions.
They may thus decide that prudent prison administration requires pretransfer
hearings. Our holding is that the Due Process Clause does not impose a nation
wide rule mandating transfer hearings.
Id

165. Comment, Two Views of a Prisoner's Right to Due Process: Meachum v.
Fano, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 405, 416 (1977).
166. 421 F. Supp. 1224 (D.N.J. 1976), affd, 562 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1977).
167. Id at 1232 n.12.
168. See supra notes 73-86 and accompanying text.
169. 421 F. Supp. at 1232 n.12.
170. 442 U.S. I (1979).
171. The statutes provided for both mandatory and discretionary parole. Parole
was automatic when an inmate had served his maximum term, less good-time credits.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-1,107(1)(b) (1981). Parole was discretionary when the minimum
term, less good time credits, had been served. Id § 83-1,110(1). See 442 U.S. at 4.
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from the Board's practices."172 The district court held that the in
mates had the same constitutionally protected "conditional liberty"
interest recognized in Morrissey v. Brewer l73 and that some of the
board's procedures fell short of constitutional guarantees. 174 The
Supreme Court stated that there was a crucial distinction between
being deprived of a liberty one may have in parole, and being denied
a conditional liberty that one desires.17S ''That the state holds out
the possibility of parole provides no more than a mere hope that the
benefit will be obtained. . . . [T]he general interest asserted here is
no more substantial than the inmate's hope that he will not be trans
ferred to another prison. . . ."176
The argument that the language of the statute 177 created a pro
tected expectation of parole was rejected by the Court which noted
that "[m]erely because a statutory expectation exists cannot mean
that in addition to the full panoply of due process required to convict
and confine there must also be repeated, adversary hearings in order
to continue the confinement."178 The Court decided that the proce
dures already in existence were adequate because to require more
would tum the process into an adversarial proceeding and experi
ence had shown that the parole release decision was "essentially an
172. 442 U.S. at 4. Hearings were conducted in two stages to determine whether to
grant or deny parole: initial review hearings (held at least once a year for every inmate)
and final parole hearings. If the Board determined the inmate was not a good risk then
parole was deferred. If the Board determined the inmate was a likely candidate then a
final hearing was scheduled. If parole was denied, the Board furnished a written state
ment of the reasons. 1d at 4-5.
173. See supra notes 129, 133 and accompanying text.
174. 442 U.S. at 5.
175. Id at 9.
176. Id at 11 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
177. The section relied on provided in pan:
Whenever the Board of Parole considers the release of a committed of
fender who is eligible for release on parole, it shall order his release unless it is
of the opinion that his release should be deferred because:
(a) There is a substantial risk that he will not conform to the conditions
of parole;
(b) His release would depreciate the seriousness of his crime or promote
disrespect for law;
(c) His release would have a substantially adverse effect on institutional
discipline; or
(d) His continued correctional treatment, medical care, or vocational or
other training in the facility will substantially enhance his capacity to lead a
law-abiding life when released at a later date. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1,114(1)
(1976).
442 U.S. at II.
178. 442 U.S. at 14.
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experienced prediction based on a host of variables."I79
Greenholtz disregards Roth,ISO Perry,ISI and WO!if}S2 The
Court previously had said that the source of a liberty interest came
from state law. IS3 In Greenholtz, however, the Court noted that even
if a state law existed there might be only the possibility of finding a
liberty interest and a mere hope that the benefit would be obtained
once that interest was found. ls4
Rhodes v. Chapman,IS5 is the most recent case in the line oflib
erty interest cases. In Rhodes, the Supreme Court held that double
celling of inmates did not violate either the eighth or fourteenth
amendments. The Supreme Court initially considered a liberty in
terest as an expansive right derived from a relationship between the
individual and the state. A balancing of interests determined
whether the individual loss outweighed the governmental interest.
Some type of hearing, although not a formal adversarial procedure,
was required prior to deprivation. The Court contended that claims
upon which people relied in their daily lives should be protected. IS6
The parameters of those claims gained definition from existing rules
or understandings}S7 A further expansion resulted when the Court
in Perry, recognized that policies and practices could be developed
and some degree of reliance and expectation eventually would be
associated with those practices. ISS In Wo!if, prison regulations were
recognized by the Court as a source from which a liberty interest
could be derived. 1S9
The Court, in Meachum, retreated from this gradual expansion
and narrowed its previous interpretation of the sources of a liberty
interest and concluded that state law was the only source from which
a liberty interest could be derived. 190 The Court further narrowed
potential sources by stating in Greenholtz that even if a state law
existed there might be only a slight possibility of finding a liberty
179. Id at 14-15.
See supra notes 130, 134-39 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 131, 140 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 141-48 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 149-65 and accompanying text.
184. 442 U.S. at II.
185. 432 U.S. 337 (1981); see supra notes 92-105 and accompanying text.
186. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577; see supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
187. 408 U.S. at 577; "See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
188. Perry, 408 U.S. at 602; see supra notes 131, 140 and accompanying text.
189. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 548, 557; see supra notes 141-48 and accompanying text.
190. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 226; see supra notes 149-60 and accompanying text.
180.
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interest and merely a hope that the benefit would be obtained. 191
The Court's recent decision in Rhodes determined that prisons which
house inmates convicted of serious crimes need not be free of dis
comfort, indicating that it would be difficult to find a liberty interest
in prison situations. l92
B.

State Created Liberty Interest

After looking to United States Supreme Court cases, the Gibson
court looked to New Jersey's statutes to determine whether a liberty
interest could be found. The court noted that under the relevant
statute, the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections was
given "broad and discretionary power over those persons who [were]
committed to the State's institutions." 193 The Commissioner also was
granted the power to administer the work of the Department of Cor
rections: 194 to issue rules and regulations; 195 to transfer inmates
from one institution to another; 196 and to designate places of confine
ment. 197 These sections refer to transfers "more appropriate for his
191. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at II; see supra notes 170-83 and accompanying text.
192. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349; see supra notes 98-107 and accompanying text.
193. 652 F.2d 348, 355 (3d Cir. 1981). The statute states that:
the purpose of the department shall be to ... provide for the custody, care,
discipline, training and treatment of persons committed to State correctional
institutions. . . to supervise and assist in the treatment and training of persons
in local correctional and detention facilities, so that such persons may be pre
pared for release and reintegration into the Community. . . .
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:IB-3 (West 1981).
194. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:IB-6. The statute, in pertinent part states:
The commissioner, as administrator and chief executive officer of the depart
ment, shall:
a. Administer the work of the department;

••••

e. Formulate, adopt, issue and promulgate, in the name of the depart
ment such rules and regulations for the efficient conduct of the work and gen
eral administration of the department. . .
f. Determine all matters relating to the unified and continuous develop
ment of the institutions and noninstitutional agencies within his jurisdiction;
g. Determine all matters of policy and regulate the administration of the
institutions or noninstitutional agencies within his jurisdiction, correct and ad
just the same so that each shall function as an integral part of a general
system..

Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. § 30:4-85. The provision states: "Any inmate of any correctional institu
tion . . . may be transferred to any other such correctional institution by order of the
commissioner directing such transfer, either upon the application of the chief executive
officer or upon the initiative of the commissioner. . . ." Id.
197. Id. § 30:4-91.1.
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needs and welfare or that of other inmates or for the security of the
institution."198 The Gibson dissent noted that the Commissioner's
discretion was restricted both by statute and by the requirement that
any exercise of discretion must not be arbitrary.199 The dissent
agreed with the majority that New Jersey, by statute, had expressly
given the Commissioner sole discretion to transfer inmates. It noted,
however, that the majority failed to point to any statutory provisions
authorizing the suspension of inmate rights at the Commissioner's
discretion. 2°O
The New Jersey legislature determined that "[t]here is a need to
... [p]rovide maximum-security confinement of those offenders
whose demonstrated propensity to acts of violence requires their sep
aration from the community ... [and that] [t]he environment for
incarcerated persons should encourage the possibilities of rehabilita
tion and reintegration into the community. . . ."201
The court referred to Rocca v. Groomes,202 in which two classifi
cation committees had recommended that a prisoner who had com
mitted a disciplinary infraction203 be transferred to a maximum
security institution. The court held that the transfer did not result in
any denial of due process although it was accomplished without a
prior hearing, reasoning that an individual is sentenced to the state
prison and not to a particular component of it. 204 Thus, an inmate
has no statutory right to remain in any particular institution since
prison officials have the broad discretion to transfer an inmate from
When a person has been convicted ofan offense against the State of New Jersey
and has been committed for a term of imprisonment by a court to an institution
. . . and when it appears to the satisfaction of the Commissioner of Institutions
and Agencies that the inmate should be transferred to an institution or facility
more appropriate for his needs and welfare or that of other inmates or for the
security of the institution, the commissioner shall be authorized and empow
ered to designate the place of confinement to which the inmate shall be trans
ferred to serve his sentence.
Id. § 30:4-91.1.
198. Id. § 30:4-91.1 (West 1981).
199. 652 F.2d at 366 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
200. Id. at 367.
201. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:IB-3 (West 1981).
202. 144 N.J. Super. 213, 365 A.2d 195 (App. Div. 1976).
203. 652 F.2d at 355 n.8. An inmate at New Jersey State Prison at Leesburg was
found guilty of a disciplinary infraction after a hearing before the Adjustment Commit
tee and was subjected to a penalty of 15 days "lock up" in the readjustment unit and the
loss of 30 days commutation credits. Upon the recommendation of the Classification
Committee and approval by the Inter-Institutional Classification Committee he was
transferred to Trenton State Prison. 144 N.J. Super. at 214-15, 365 A.2d at 196.
204. Id.
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one institution to another.20s
The Gibson dissent argued that the state created right need not
be embodied in a statute206 and examined Winsett v. MpGinnes,207 a
Third Circuit decision, as relevant to Gibson's situation. Winsett
was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for felony murder
of a Delaware state police officer.20s After serving ten years as a
model prisoner he requested work release certification. 209 His appli
cation was approved by two of the three requisite levels of deci
sionmakers but, before the superintendent could give his approval,
public opposition began to mount. 210 Winsett's application subse
quently was rejected. Winsett then filed a civil rights action alleging
that the superintendent's consideration of public opinion was an im
permissible basis for evaluation of such applications. 2I I
Winsett's claim of a liberty interest was grounded in the regula
tions issued by the Department of Corrections, promulgated by the
department to implement the basic legislative grant of authority to
create a work release program. 212 The Third Circuit found that a
"state-created liberty interest in work release arises when a prisoner
meets all eligibility requirements under the state regulations and the
exercise of the prison authorities' discretion is consistent with work
release policy."213 The Third Circuit did not review the prison au
thorities' discretion as absolute, and therefore such discretion did not
negate the existence of the state created entitlement. 214
The Gibson majority, however, concluded that the Commis
sioner's rules and regulations concerning the use of solitary confine
ment dealt only with disciplinary detention, protective custody
detention, and administrative segregation, and did not limit the use
of segregated housing for housing holds. 2ls A provision of the New
Jersey statutes provides that "[a]ny person transferred . . . shall be
held in the custody of the institution to which transfer is made, sub
ject to the rules and regulations thereof and the provisions of law
applicable thereto as though originally committed to such institu
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

215.

Id at 215, 365 A.2d at 199.
652 F.2d at 363 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
617 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1980), cerro denied, 449 U.S. 1093 (1981).
Id at 999.
Id
Id at 1000.
Id at 998.
Id at 1005.
Id at 1007.
Id at 1006.
652 F.2d at 355.
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tion."216 A further provision specifies that
every State penal and correctional institution shall formally pro
mulgate and publish rules and regulations governing the rights,
privileges, duties and obligations of the inmate population [and]
. . . detail the procedures for imposing summary and administra
tive punishment as well as for appealing therefrom. No punish
ment may be meted out other than of the type and in the manner
prescribed by such rules and regulations. . . . Upon the arrival
of a prisoner ... he shall be furnished with a copy of the institu
tion's rules and regulations and shall have the meaning of the
same explained to him. 217

Gibson was sent to Yardville on January 25, 1977. On Febru
ary 8, 1977, he was classified for Rahway. On February 18, 1977, the
addendum to the Trenton State Prison Inmate Handbook was pub
lished providing that "administrative quarantine at State Prison,
Trenton is to be used for the. . . housing of. . . Prison Reception
Unit housing holds assigned by Inter-Institution Classification Com
mittee for assignment to State Prison, Rahway or State Prison, Lees
burg."21s The Inter-Institution Classification Committee is
comprised of the Superintendents of Trenton, Rahway and Leesburg
State Prison or their designates. 219 Before the addendum was added
to the handbook, solitary confinement was restricted to two catego
ries of individuals: The first category was for inmates requiring spe
cial detention as a means of discipline; the second category, called
administrative segregation, applied to inmates in need of protective
custody or who continued to violate the institution's rules or regula
tions or who posed a continued serious threat to the inmate's safety
and security.220
Apparently, the superintendents of the respective institutions
met, noted the existence of a cell shortage, and, in response, created
the new classification of administrative quarantine. Because the
description of administrative quarantine does not mention that hous
ing holds would be inmates who were disciplinary problems or in
need of protective custody, it is perplexing why the description in
216. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-86 (West 1981).
217. Id. § 30:4-8.4, 5.
218. Brief on Behalf of Defendant-Appellant at 33a, supra note 16.
219. 652 F.2d at 356 n.lO.
220. Id. at 367 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). Detention requires a due process
hearing and is limited to a maximum period of 30 days. Id. A due process hearing is
also required before administrative segregation can be imposed and confinement can last
as long as the inmate demonstrates an inability to get along. Id.
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cluded a list of sanctions to which the housing holds would be sub
jected. The sanctions proscribe contact visitation rights and yard
recreation rights. Inmates so confined would not be processed
through the Classification Committee for custody or program assign
ments.221 The district court and the Third Circuit dissent believed
that administrative quarantine was meant to expand the category of
prisoners who could be isolated and was not meant to deprive these
inmates of the rights afforded to every other isolated prisoner. 222
The Third Circuit specifically rejected the arguments of Gibson
and the district court that New Jersey's disciplinary regulations were
the source of Gibson's liberty interest,223 Gibson contended that be
cause a prisoner who had been segregated for disciplinary reasons
must be afforded a hearing and periodic review of his confinement in
isolation, a fortiori, a prisoner such as Gibson who had committed
no infraction, should, at the least, be entitled to the same procedure
before being subjected to the same conditions. 224 The court, how
ever, stated that the only standards and regulations of New Jersey
limiting the authority and discretion of prison officials were found in
the context of disciplinary, protective custody, and severe risk
cases. 225 Prisoners, in those cases, could claim a substantive right not
to be so confined without due process protections. The court further
reasoned that Gibson did not fall into any of these categories be
cause he was segregated solely as a result of the cell shortage and
because he was not the type of prisoner who properly would be clas
sified for general population at Trenton. 226 Gibson, therefore, had
no substantive right that was entitled to due process protection.
Administrative quarantine had been created to alleviate the
overcrowding, thus, Gibson did not fall within any of the previously
stated categories. The claim that Gibson was not the type of pris
oner for general population at Trenton was an indication that prison
officials wanted to protect him from the inmates at Trenton who
were there because they had committed serious offenses. Superin
tendent Hilton testified that although the Leesburg prisoners were
"minimum" custody status, he was not concemed. 227 Some of these
Leesburg prisoners were transferred to general population in Tren
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Brief on Behalf of Defendant-Appellant at 34a, supra note 16.
652 F.2d at 368 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
Id at 358.
Id
Id
Id
Trial Transcript at 11-12, supra note 70.
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ton. 228 The court's reasoning is far from clear in explaining why an
inmate who does not fit within a particular defined category, yet
whose treatment in effect is the same as those who do fit withln that
category, should be denied the same procedural protections. If Gib
son had committed an infraction, he would have been entitled to a
due process hearing after which the maximum period of solitary con
finement was thirty days.229 In deciding that the Commissioner's
discretion is limited only by regulations which specifically state the
prisoner has a right to due process protections, the Third Circuit, in
effect, gave prison administrators the authority to determine under
what circumstances a substantive right will exist.
IV.

RIGHT TO A HEARING

The Third Circuit stated that disciplinary hearings were held to
determine if the prisoner breached a prison rule. In Gibson's case,
however, there was no basis upon which to hold a hearing.23o The
court stated that Gibson's complaint did not pertain to the fact that
he did not receive a hearing but that he was kept in solitary confine
menU3l Even if he were to have received a hearing, he would have
been dissatisfied. The court concluded that a hearing at this point
would have consisted of no more than a statement to Gibson that he
was being held in quarantine because of a shortage of cell space in
general population. 232
A hearing in this situation should be more than simply the obvi
ous statement that the inmate was being kept in quarantine. It
should consist of a brief explanation of the situation, how long
prison officials thought the situation would continue, and what the
inmate could expect during his confinement under quarantine condi
tions. Assurances that the inmate would be removed from quaran
tine as soon as a cell became available might also be given. A
hearing would serve the important administrative functions of creat
ing a record, providing official notification, and putting prison offi
cials on notice that a prisoner was being held in solitary confinement
pending a transfer to the assigned institution.
The dissent argued that "[e]xperience has shown that when ad
ministrators are required to document the reasons for their decisions
228. Id at 191.
Gibson, 652 F.2d at 360.
230. Id
231. Id
232. Id

229.
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the constitutional and statutory rights of persons affected by those
decisions receive greater consideration and protection. It is this
value which is lost when the right to due process is abrogated."233
In Smoake v. Fritz ,234 the State of New York argued that pris
oners who had been placed in segregated quarters were being kept in
"administrative segregation" rather than solitary confinement or pu
nitive segregation. 235 The court concluded that the distinction was
largely semantic: each was in his cell twenty-three hours per day,
there was no mingling with the general population or participation
in normal prison activities. 236 Access to the mess hall was denied,
inmates wore the same clothing for seven days, showers were pro
vided once a week, and there was no hot water supplied. 237 These
arguments are applicable to Gibson's situation for he was subjected
to similar treatment and similar rationalizations were advanced by
prison officials.
In King v. Higgins, 238 the court stated that it was no answer to
the failure to provide notice prior to the hearing that "King knew
why he had been placed in the 'Awaiting Action' cell."239 The pris
oner was entitled to due process "whether the decision affecting his
status was based on security, rehabilitation, or punishment."240
The Gibson dissent also argued that Gibson did not differ from
a prisoner in the segregation category241 because the prison officials
stated they had placed him in administrative quarantine because he .
was not the type of prisoner who would properly be classified for
general population. 242 Judge Higginbotham inquired, "Is the right
to due process so fragile that it can be lost by a sleight of hand that
Id at 369 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
320 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
235. Id at 610.
236. Id
237. Id
238. 370 F. Supp. 1023 (D. Mass. 1974).
239. Id at 1028.
240. Id at 1029.
While the prisoner may be charged with knowledge of facts and circumstances
of a particular event, he cannot be charged with knowledge as to the legal inter
pretation or theory of action which prison authorities may seek to follow with
respect to such event. The situation is analogous to that involving an individual
who knows the circumstances which brought about his arrest, but is nonetheless
entitled to notice as to the theory of action the government intends to pursue
with respect to his case.
Id at 1028.
241. 652 F.2d at 368 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). A prisoner is put in segrega
tion because of an inability to get along in the general population. Id
242. Id
233.

234.
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alters form but leaves substance untouched? I cannot believe that
such a drastic change in constitutional protection can be effected by
the mere expedient of a name change."243
V.

CONCLUSION

Gibson v. Lynch244 is representative of a developing trend to
narrow prisoners' rights. A number of Supreme Court decisions
have provided an impetus to lower courts dealing with questions of
prisoners' rights. The Court initially placed emphasis on the indi
vidual loss in a given circumstance and balanced individual and
governmental interests. Claims relied upon by people in their daily
lives were to be protected. The Court eventually recognized that
policies and practices could develop upon which some degree of reli
ance and expectation would become associated.
The Court's decision in Meachum v. Fano 24S marked the begin
ning of its withdrawal from this expansive line of decisions.
Meachum heralded another equally expansive line of decisions
which contorted the earlier pronouncements into unrecognizable
vestiges. Meachum has been interpreted to mean that if the state has
not provided a liberty interest to the prisoner in any of its laws, then
the prisoner cannot find such an interest elsewhere.
The case was not intended to establish a nationwide rule in
transfer situations, but such a rule has evolved. There were no dep
rivations imposed upon the Meachum transferees after their transfer
to the receiving institution. The decision has been held determina
tive in transfer situations which resulted in the imposition of depri
vations at the receiving institution. Unlike the situation in Gibson,
the transfers in other cases were the result of rule violations by the
transferred inmates. The transfer thus becomes somewhat more jus
tifiable in those cases due to issues of prison security. Most dis
turbing is the judiciary's willingness to close its eyes to these'
disparities and apply Meachum as a standard applicable to all situa
tions in which a prisoner is moved from one institution to another,
irrespective of the motivations behind the move.
The consequences of these decisions are that federal courts
should not interfere in prison administration; state law has become
the source of a liberty interest; prison administrators are to be ac
corded wide-ranging deference; prisoners can be transferred from
243. ld
244. 652 F.2d 348 (3d Cir. 1981).
245. 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
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one institution to another and subjected to adverse conditions where
exigent circumstances exist and the security of the institution is pro
moted; and preliminary hearings are not necessary where the pris
oner "knows" the reasons for his treatment.
The Gibson court, like other courts, misinterpreted Meachum. It
failed to look to its own decision in Winsett. The court looked in
stead for an explicit statement in the very recently written and
adopted Addendum which would grant housing holds the right to a
hearing and would limit the length of time spent in solitary confine
ment. Finding no such statement, the court decided it could reach
no other conclusion than that Gibson had no liberty interest. Gibson
is a result-oriented decision that effectively denies prisoners any re
covery from such arbitrary treatment.
Theresa A. St. Helaire

